Causation, God , and the Justification of Induction: Part 2

[Cross-posted at Philosophical Pontifications]

I think the argument of Part 1 is a good one, but it does not quite establish its conclusion: While it is highly likely, given IBE, that chance is not the true account of the regularity of the universe, metaphysically necessary causal connections are not the only alternative. Indeed, in some cases they are seemingly not even a possible alternative. For quantum mechanics tells us, on most of its interpretations, that many of the most basic regularities in nature are probabilistic. Unless we’re prepared to posit “probabilistic necessities”—i.e., that it could be necessary that something happens only in a certain percentage of cases—many of the regularities described by quantum mechanics cannot be necessary. So how could we explain them?

If we accept theism, there is a way. God, being all powerful, could surely act in such a manner that certain things happen only with a certain frequency, not all the time. But God, according to theists, is not merely some convenient metaphysical explanatory posit. He is a personal being. While perhaps not having a psychology like ours—God probably doesn’t think discursively, with one thought following after another—He is nevertheless an agent who acts for the sake of ends. Provided that those ends include creating a word that is regular—perhaps  because only such worlds are hospitable to life or sentience—it would be extremely probable, or even certain, that such a world would be actual.

Now, if we consider the matter in terms of “epistemic possibility”, there are many “possible Gods”, or “ways God could be”. A great deal of them would have no desire to create worlds that are regular. I don’t know of any good arguments to the effect that such “Gods” couldn’t have existed, so we can’t rule them out a priori. Instead, I think a theist should insist that given our actual evidence we aren’t justified in believing in them, because it is only if we posit a God who desires to create a world that exhibits regularities, albeit probabilistic ones, that we have reason to suspect such a world to be actual. If there is such a God we certainly have a better account than we would have if we thought such regularities were merely “an outrageous run of luck”. So the observed regularities in nature do cry out for explanation, but on this view their probabilistic nature favors a theistic account. Given the constancy of God’s nature and purposes, we are can confidently expect them to persist in the future. The above account, if true, would not constitute an airtight proof that the inductive schema of Part 1 is reliable, but I think it would give us a good (though defeasible) reason to accept it.

           

But all is not well. In Part 3 I’ll examine a couple objections to this account.

Causation, God , and the Justification of Induction: Part 1

[Cross-posted at Philosophical Pontifications]

Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought, vol. 2 , Ch. XXXII, “Concrete Necessity and Internal Relations”; Reason and Analysis, Ch. XI, “Necessity in Causation”) and A.C. Ewing (Non-Linguistic Philosophy: Ch. VI, “Causation and Induction”) gave similar arguments for the existence of “logical necessity” in causation. (Given that their views of logic are somewhat unorthodox by the standards of analytic philosophers, I think it would be more accurate and less confusing to talk of metaphysical necessity in causation, which I will do in what follows.) A “rational reconstruction” of their arguments goes something like this: If causal connections are not metaphysically necessary, the fact that similar effects follow upon similar causes, or that there are certain, seemingly exceptionless regularities in nature (which can be expressed in laws of nature) is quite remarkable. If “anything can cause anything”, as Humeans sometimes say, we have a tremendous coincidence, “an outrageous run of luck”, as Blanshard puts it (The Nature of Thought, vol. 2, Ch XXXII, “Concrete Necessity and Internal Relations”, p. 505 of the second edition), comparable to rolling a die and getting a 4 a trillion times in a row. But if causal connections are metaphysically necessary, we have a good explanation for the fact that similar effects follow upon similar causes, or that there are exceptionless regularities in nature: they obtain because they must. If events of type B necessarily follow upon events of type A, any token A event will be followed by a token B event. (Not, of course, that we can perceive this necessity: we could only perceive it if we had some kind of direct insight into the natures of type A events and type B events.) Granting that, it follows that we can justify instances of inductive inference that fit the following schema: Events of type A have always been followed by events of type B, hence, events of type A will always be followed by events of type B. 

Our argument for this schema is neither deductive nor inductive: We have not deduced, and neither have we seen through “rational insight”, that it is necessary that type A events will always be followed by type B events based on knowledge of their natures, nor have we concluded that type A events will always be followed by type B events just because they have always been so followed in the past. Our argument is rather this: In certain cases we take ourselves to have established that every observed event of type A has been followed by an observed event of type B. We also note that, since type A events are observed very frequently, it is extremely unlikely (though possible) that their association with type B events is a matter of chance. So there are two alternatives: Either the association is an astronomically improbable coincidence, or there is a necessary connection between them, albeit one that we are not able to discern.  Next we consider the principle of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE): This principle says, very roughly, that if we have multiple hypotheses vying to account for some phenomenon, it is most reasonable to accept the hypothesis which best explains it as being true. And if we think that having any explanation is rationally preferable to having none—assuming we have no evidence which rules out all of the candidate explanations, or which renders them extremely improbable—then IBE tells us that it is always more reasonable to accept an explanatory hypothesis over a non-explanatory one. Since coincidence is no explanation, in the present case IBE counsels us to accept the hypothesis that there is a metaphysically necessary connection between type A events and type B events. Because of this necessary connection, we can conclude that in the future type A events will always be followed by type B events, just as they always have been. So we have justified our inductive schema neither deductively nor inductively, but by IBE.

Note that in the above we have not invoked the principle of sufficient reason or the idea that every event must have a cause; we are only saying that it is more reasonable to believe in a necessary connection than an astronomical coincidence. Thus the objections that can be raised against them cannot be raised against the present argument.

At this point you might be wondering about IBE. What justifies us in accepting it? Why should we believe that the hypothesis which best explains a phenomenon is the most rationally acceptable one? I think it can be justified, although it can neither be justified deductively, nor inductively, nor by IBE. It cannot be justified deductively because IBE is clearly not a truth of logic or mathematics. It also cannot be justified inductively, at least not by the kind of inductive inference being considered on the present account, because we are trying to use IBE to justify those inductive inferences, and to use them to justify IBE would be circular. Finally, to use IBE to justify itself would also be circular. Instead, I think IBE can be justified “transcendentally”. It is essentially a case of “this or nothing”. If we did not regard better explanations as more rationally acceptable, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to justify anything that goes beyond our beliefs about elementary logic and our immediate perceptual experiences. (For one instance of this problem, see my post over at Philosophical Pontifications on Bertrand Russell’s five minute hypothesis. ) This does not refute skepticism, but it does show that anyone who rejects skepticism is entitled to use IBE; or, at the very least, that they cannot consistently criticize those who do use it.

“But how does God figure into all this?”, you might ask. If you want to know, stay tuned for Part 2!

Biblical Passages, Nice and Not-So-Nice: Romans 2: 6-16

⁶For he will repay according to each one’s deeds: ⁷to those who by patiently doing good seek for glory and honour and immortality, he will give eternal life; ⁸while for those who are self-seeking and who obey not the truth but wickedness, there will be wrath and fury. ⁹There will be anguish and distress for everyone who does evil, the Jew first and also the Greek, ¹⁰but glory and honour and peace for everyone who does good, the Jew first and also the Greek. ¹¹For God shows no partiality.

12 All who have sinned apart from the law will also perish apart from the law, and all who have sinned under the law will be judged by the law. ¹³For it is not the hearers of the law who are righteous in God’s sight, but the doers of the law who will be justified. ¹⁴When Gentiles, who do not possess the law, do instinctively what the law requires, these, though not having the law, are a law to themselves. ¹⁵They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, to which their own conscience also bears witness; and their conflicting thoughts will accuse or perhaps excuse them ¹⁶on the day when, according to my gospel, God, through Jesus Christ, will judge the secret thoughts of all.

--Romans 2: 6-16, NRSV http://bible.oremus.org/?passage=Romans+2

Biblical Passages, Nice and Not-So-Nice: Romans 9: 6-24 [and 11: 25-32]

6 It is not as though the word of God had failed. For not all Israelites truly belong to Israel, ⁷and not all of Abraham’s children are his true descendants; but ‘It is through Isaac that descendants shall be named after you.’ ⁸This means that it is not the children of the flesh who are the children of God, but the children of the promise are counted as descendants. ⁹For this is what the promise said, ‘About this time I will return and Sarah shall have a son.’ ¹⁰Nor is that all; something similar happened to Rebecca when she had conceived children by one husband, our ancestor Isaac. ¹¹Even before they had been born or had done anything good or bad (so that God’s purpose of election might continue, ¹²not by works but by his call) she was told, ‘The elder shall serve the younger.’ ¹³As it is written,
‘I have loved Jacob,
   but I have hated Esau.’

14 What then are we to say? Is there injustice on God’s part? By no means! ¹⁵For he says to Moses,
‘I will have mercy on whom I have mercy,
   and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.’
¹⁶So it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God who shows mercy. ¹⁷For the scripture says to Pharaoh, ‘I have raised you up for the very purpose of showing my power in you, so that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth.’ ¹⁸So then he has mercy on whomsoever he chooses, and he hardens the heart of whomsoever he chooses.

God’s Wrath and Mercy

19 You will say to me then, ‘Why then does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?’ ²⁰But who indeed are you, a human being, to argue with God? Will what is moulded say to the one who moulds it, ‘Why have you made me like this?’ ²¹Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one object for special use and another for ordinary use? ²²What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience the objects of wrath that are made for destruction; ²³and what if he has done so in order to make known the riches of his glory for the objects of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory— ²⁴including us whom he has called, not from the Jews only but also from the Gentiles?

--Romans 9: 6-24 NRSV http://bible.oremus.org/?passage=Romans+9

EDIT: I should add that this passage does not necessarily entail that God predestines some people not to be saved. For a little later on Paul says:

25 So that you may not claim to be wiser than you are, brothers and sisters, I want you to understand this mystery: a hardening has come upon part of Israel, until the full number of the Gentiles has come in. ²⁶And so all Israel will be saved; as it is written,
‘Out of Zion will come the Deliverer;
   he will banish ungodliness from Jacob.’
²⁷ ‘And this is my covenant with them,
   when I take away their sins.’
²⁸As regards the gospel they are enemies of God for your sake; but as regards election they are beloved, for the sake of their ancestors; ²⁹for the gifts and the calling of God are irrevocable. ³⁰Just as you were once disobedient to God but have now received mercy because of their disobedience, ³¹so they have now been disobedient in order that, by the mercy shown to you, they too may now receive mercy. ³²For God has imprisoned all in disobedience so that he may be merciful to all.

--Romans 11: 25-32 NRSV [emphasis mine, and footnotes ommitted], http://bible.oremus.org/?passage=Romans+11

Note that the last sentence prima facie implies universalism; i.e., that all will be saved.

"...the greatest of these is love"...

... so said Paul in 1 Corinthians 13 (verse13); elevating love above faith and hope. A similar thought was expressed by Henry Drummond in the following passage of his essay "Love, the Greatest Thing In the World", from his book, The Greatest Thing In the World And Other Addresses:

In the Book of Matthew, where the Judgment Day is depicted for us in the imagery of One seated upon a throne and dividing the sheep from the goats, the test of a man then is not, "How have I believed?" but "How have I loved?" The test of religion, the final test of religion, is not religiousness, but Love. I say the final test of religion at that great Day is not religiousness, but Love; not what I have done, not what I have believed, not what I have achieved, but how I have discharged the common charities of life. Sins of commission in that awful indictment are not even referred to. By what we have not done, by sins of omission, we are judged. It could not be otherwise. For the withholding of love is the negation of the spirit of Christ, the proof that we never knew Him, that for us He lived in vain. It means that He suggested nothing in all our thoughts, that He inspired nothing in all our lives, that we were not once near enough to Him, to be seized with the spell of His compassion for the world. It means that—

"I lived for myself, I thought for myself, For myself, and none beside— Just as if Jesus had never lived, As if He had never died."

You can find the book online here. For Christians, I think this is a good reminder that loving one another is what really matters; as opposed, say, to disputes about fine points of doctrine. And whether Christian or not, I think you can be inspired by the idea that the most important thing in life is love. Thanks to Robin Parry for quoting from this passage in his post What is "a good Christian"? over at Theological Scribbles.

On Free Will and Heavenly Sins

Let us suppose that some form of Christianity is true (or very true, or very nearly true…); in particular, let us suppose that there is such a place (or state) as heaven, where those who are good go after they die to enjoy eternal bliss. Could there be sin and/or evil in heaven? If there could, it is hard to see what could guarantee that heaven will remain heavenly. If the world is as—shall we say—imperfect as it is, with all of its miseries, cruelties, and injustices; and if this is so primarily because God has granted people libertarian free will—that is, a variety of free will that involves the ability to do otherwise than what one actually does—what reason do we have to think that heaven will be much better? Sure enough, there won’t be any really bad people there—no Hitlers, no Maos, no Stalins—but even relatively good people do bad things from time to time. So long as it is possible for saints (those in heaven) to sin, given enough time it becomes almost certain that they will do so. So if God wants to prevent the occurrence of “heavenly sins”, He will have to restrict saints’ libertarian free will. This does not imply theistic determinism: God could still allow people to choose one good act in preference to another, but He would render them incapable of choosing any bad ones. This is, as far as I know, the Catholic view (see here, section IV), and I am not sure which other Christian denominations would accept it.

Supposing it is correct, the question arises of why God doesn’t do the same for us. Why does God allow people on Earth to sin if He could prevent it? Is the answer that if He did so we would be His marionettes; that God does not want to “force us” to love Him or to do the right thing? If so, aren’t saints God’s marionettes? Is the significance of their love diminished because they cannot choose not to love God?

At this point I think a Christian who agrees with the Catholic view can make the following reply: Free will is valuable, but only in certain contexts and for certain purposes. Granted, the free will of saints is restricted, but this is not a bad thing because they did have the ability to sin during their lives. However, in choosing to accept God’s grace and do the right thing they have rejected sin. (What if you believe in “irresistible grace”? In that case you shouldn’t be concerned about libertarian free will in the first place, and you also face the problem of having to explain why a loving God wouldn’t grant His irresistible grace to everyone.) God wanted people to choose to love Him, align their will with His and reject evil freely over the course of their lives. Once they have done so, it is no longer necessary for their wills to be so free. They have proven their worth and there is no need for further testing.

One could think of it this way: Would saints want to be able to sin? If their love for God is strong, I think they wouldn’t. They might recognize that this ability is necessary for one stage of their existence, for without it they could not really choose to love God, and forced love would not really be love. Yet if they have made and confirmed that choice throughout their lives, they have no reason to want to retain this ability forever, because if they did retain it there would be a chance they could do something to damage their relationship with God, and presumably they don’t want that. In effect, saints have chosen to restrict their free will.  Given that their lives involved accepting God’s grace, doing good and choosing to love God, why wouldn’t God honor their choice? Even if they don’t consciously make that choice, we may suppose that God will restrict their free will just in case He sees that that is what they would choose if they explicitly considered the matter.

Thus the reason why people have unrestricted libertarian free will on Earth is that God wants our love of Him to be genuine, and thus for us to be free to accept or reject Him—for a time. Such, at any rate, runs one possible Christian reply. I leave it now to my readers to see if they think it succeeds.

A response to "Where I stand on Christianity"

A friend of mine has posted a reply to my post "Where I stand on Christianity". You can check it out here.
My apologies for not linking to it sooner.